Small and medium-size enterprises in economic development : possiblities for research and policy by Winter, Sidney G.
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1508
Small and Medium-Size  How  (if at all) can the  World
Bank  promote economic
Enterprises in Economic  development  by mobilizing
Development  resources  organized  as  small
and medium-size  enterprises
in developing countries?
Possibilities for Research and Policy  What lines of research  about
small  and medium-size
enterprises  would  help
Sidney G. Winter  support the Bank's
policymaking in this area?
The World Bank
Policy Research Department

















































































































dPoI icY  RESFARCH  WORKINC.  PAPER  1508
Summary  findings
The World Bank's most important long-term advantage  consider how these and other sources define prevailing
in promoting development, says Winter, may lie in  ,standards"  for small and medium-size enterprises.)
opportunities to address related obstacles simultaneously.  The economic significance of high "turbulence"
It could mount concurrent efforts to address the  (entry and exit rates) in small-firm populations is poorly
problems of small and medium-size enterprises iti a  understood. The fact of high turbulence is well-
particular sector, region, or economy, for example. It  documented in industrial countries; it is not for
could address the conditions of founding new firms,  developing countries, but available data suggest a broadly
providirng  finance or technical assistance, developing  similar pattern. Are high failure rates for small businesses
mutual support  institutions, resolving disputes, and  symptomatic of an important shortcoming in the system
perhaps reducing counterproductive  governmenr  of economic organization itself? Or should the unit of
inrervenitions.  analysis be the enterprise, the entrepreneur,  or the
Were the Bank to follow such a coordinated approach,  entrepreneur's  family?
progranis could be designed to generate data to  * Is the apparent trend favoring a larger economic role
illuminate the impacts and interactions of various  for smaller production  units autonomous rather than
elements of policy. These data could be exploited, then,  induced by other changes? Does it depend on general
in research desigins,  or even the design of management  operating factors such as the declining costs of
information  systems, shaped by program evaluation.  communication and computation?
Winter proposes four general issues for research (plus  The rate of learning by a small firm may depend on
a series of topics for each issue):  the nature of its transacting partner. Certain
- Can Bank initiatives involving small and medium-  multinational enterprises make good teachers, for
size enterprises in developing countries facilitate the  example, but certain local labor markets or markets for
entry of these enterprises  into similar learning  consumer goods and services may not be well-positioned
relationships with other firms - foreign firms, larger  for relevant learning. They may learn well how to adjust
firms in their own countries, or each other? (Topics/  to local circumstances but not to the international
actionable items: Identify large firms noted  for their  diffusion of technology and ways of organizing (the main
willingness to help improve their suppliers' operations;  source of hope for developing countries). Perhaps Bank
survey these firms' practices and the criteria they use to  policy should be more concerned with transaction
identify possible suppliers not currently in their system;  patterns.
This paper-  a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development  Division, Policy Research Department-is  part of a larger
effort in the department  to study small and medium-size enterprises and their role in development.  Copies of the paper are available
free from the World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washinigton, DC 20433.  Please contact  Daniele Evans, room N9-059,  telephone
202-473-8526,  fax 202-522-1  155, Internet  address devans@worldbank.org.  September  1995. (58 pages)
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The  general  question  of  the  role  of  small  and  medium
enterprise  in economic development  is the subject of renewed
discussion at the World Bank.  Specific questions range from the
most  fundamental --  for example,  is there anything about the
economics of small and medium enterprise that actually warrants
this attention? --  to issues of policy orientation, definition
of related research topics, and design of specific policies that
the Bank might pursue.  In this informal essay, I attempt to
contribute to the Bank's discussion in a way that aims at being
provocative  and also reflects my comparative  advantage.  One
source of that comparative advantage is that I can bring a fresh
point of view to the subject; this is the optimistic assessment
of the fact that I do not have specific expertise relating to
economic development or small and medium  enterprise, nor do I
have more than a general appreciation of the nature of past Bank
policy in the area.  I do, however, have some experience with
policy research, and a long-standing interest in how economic
theories  and  concepts  relate  to  the  various  "facts  on  the
ground,"  including behavioral  facts,  institutional  facts  and
managerial/administrative facts.  Such understanding as I have
managed  to  obtain  in  this  quest  may  perhaps  be  helpful  in2
identifying the promising types of programs that the Bank might
pursue in relation to small and medium enterprise.
The principal purpose of this essay is to identify lines of
research  on  small  and  medium  enterprise  that  would  provide
helpful support to the Bank's policy making in the area.  It is,
however, not really possible to separate the question of what
policy research is needed from the question of what the policy
should be.  Ideally, the relationship between policy making and
policy research is  a dialogue that becomes increasingly specific
as  it proceeds.  The  significance  of  this  general point  is
magnified  in the present context by the fact that  "small and
medium  enterprise"  is  such  a  broad  category;  narrowing  the
domain in some  way is a  prime requisite both for coherent policy
and for a coherent research program, and the narrowing has to
accomplished in  mutually consistent ways.  It is for this reason
that  I  present  a  framework  of  policy  ideas  in  this  paper;
without such a framework the research suggestions would not make
much sense.  This rationale can be restated as a disclaimer: the
policy ideas set forth in this essay are not to be construed as
assumptions of fact about the  present or future course of the
Bank's policies.
The essay is organized as follows.  In the first section I
propose a  specific framing of the policy question  facing  the
Bank,  and describe the analytical background  from which  this
question  is  addressed.  The  second  section  lays  out  three
principles  that  the  Bank might  adopt  in developing  policies3
toward small and medium enterprise.  Section three reviews some
areas of current understanding of  the economics of small and
medium  enterprise;  the  empirical  discussion  draws
disproportionately on evidence from advanced countries where the
data  are better.  Research  suggestions  are set  forth  in the
final section.
Perspectives
On the cruestion.  I begin by framing the question that I
will  address  in  this  essay:  How  (if at  all)  can  the Bank
promote economic development by mobilizing resources organized
as small and medium  enterprises in developing  countries?  In
addition  to using  this framing in my  own discussion  here,  I
intend also to offer support for the idea that some such framing
would  provide  a  useful  structure  for  the  Bank's  internal
discussion.  (There is, of course, no  clearly  identifiable
recipient for this sort of suggestion,  there being  no office
charged with the determination of discussion frameworks.)
Although  this  proposed  framing  has  the  ring  of  bland
generalities,  it may be controversial  in some respects.  For
this reason, the explanation below  is relatively detailed and
mixed  with  some  advocacy.  The  minimum  objective  of  this
advocacy is to persuade the reader that this framing might be
acceptable.  The maximum  aspiration  is to contribute  to the
development of a consensus at the Bank that something like this
is, in fact, the most helpful way to frame the question.4
How  ...  can  the  Bank:  The  question  to  be  addressed  is
ultimately  about policy design  for the Bank.  It is not,  for
example, about the merits or demerits of SMEs as a feature of a
society.  It is not even about the conditions that promote or
impede the development of SMEs, except, perhaps, to the extent
that those conditions are influenceable by Bank policies.
(if  at  all):  The quest for an effective policy could in
the end prove fruitless.  More important, it could be partially
successful to a degree that implies limiting the scale and scope
of Bank activity in the near term to something less than what
the Bank might be prepared to support.  My own expectation is
that  the  opposite  is  more  likely  to be  the  case  --  that  the
attractive policy opportunities will soon, if not immediately,
outrun the available resources.  But this issue should not be
pre-judged: doing so risks contaminating truly promising ideas
for productive  initiatives with  an  admixture  of marginal  or
counterproductive ideas, thus obscuring the promising ones and
sacrificing  the  future  gains  potentially  achievable  by  the
gradual expansion of their application.
promote  economic  development:  Economic  development
presumably  retains its status as an acknowledged high-level
goal, although it may have acquired controversial connotations.
I propose that it should also be clearly acknowledged as the
specific sub-goal that should be addressed in designing policy
toward SMEs.  This proposed commitment at the sub-goal level can
be explained by considering  some rejected alternatives.  For5
example, it has been argued that encouraging small and medium
enterprise strengthens bourgeois values and enhances political
stability,  and  by  that  path  serves  to  promote  economic
development  and  other  high  level  goals,  such  as  democracy.
While I accept the logic, I am quite skeptical about the idea of
designing policy to promote economic development via bourgeois
values and  political stability, largely  because I  am doubtful as
to whether  anyone  knows  how  to do  that.  I would  similarly
reject, in the policy  design context, the idea SMEs that are
generically  deserving  of  support  on  the  ground  of  their
presumptive generic contributions to these sorts of objectives.
However valid,  such  a  claim  does  not provide  a  sufficiently
strong focus for the design task --  and thus risks the waste of
the  Bank's opportunities and resources.  Similar risk inheres in
the idea that SMEs are generically deserving of support because
of their role in job creation.  The latter case demands more
careful analysis, which is provided below.
In the first approximation I  advocate instead the following
train of interpretations:  economic development means economic
growth;  economic  growth  means  productivity  growth,  and
productivity  growth  means  measurable  (though not  necessarily
measured)  growth  in output per  input.  I would,  of course,
concede  (in  the  second  approximation)  that  none  of  those
interpretations is exact.  There are valued aspects of economic
development  that go beyond  output  growth  as  that  is usually
conceived.  Also,  the  use  of productivity  as  a  performance6
measure is  not appealing at the conceptual level; the principles
of benefit-cost analysis provide the best available guidance for
how  success  might  conceivably  be  defined  and  measured  in
quantitative terms.  And of course it should be recognized that
whereas a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis leaves off where
the  difficult  and  fundamental  value  questions  begin,  those
questions  still  deserve  consideration  according  to  the  best
wisdom and judgment that can be mustered.
However, given realistic constraints on the availability of
data  and  analytical  capability,  a  discussion  of  policy
alternatives couched in the sophisticated rhetoric of the second
approximation is likely to be a discussion that loses contact
with evidence entirely.  For policy design purposes, the first
approximation has the considerable advantage that a relatively
clear-cut  and  demonstrable  policy  failure  becomes  readily
imaginable  --  a  feature  that  is  desirable  because  of  its
contribution to sharp focus; it "concentrates the mind".
mobilizing:  The choice of the verb here  is intended to
stress  the  role  of  the Bank  as an  active  organizing  agent.
There is a subtle, but I think important, difference between a
view that sees the Bank in this role and one that places  the
SMEs themselves in a more central position --  a view that might
be expressed  by some such phrase  as "'  ...  reduce  obstacles  to the
development  of  small  and  medium  enterprise."  The  latter
formulation  would  flow  naturally  from  a  "market  failure"
orientation  to economic policy, a perspective  that insinuates7
the idea that "but for X" all virtues requisite to good economic
performance already reside in the economic actors, and the only
legitimate  task of policy  is to do something about X.  While
this perspective affords many useful insights, it is for  various
reasons not adequate to the problem at hand.'
The importance of escaping the market failure mind-set may
reach as far as the conceptualization of Bank itself.  The Bank
is  no  exception  to  the  rule  that  the  capabilities  of
institutions matter just as much as their policies; an attempt
to  discuss  policies  without  regard  to  the  associated
capabilities risks being illusory or vacuous.  Thus, to suggest
a  possible  role  for the  Bank  as  "mobilizing ... "  is to make  an
implicit judgment about what sort of organization the Bank is or
could be.
resources organized as small and medium enterprises:  Most
copy editors would probably want  to edit the words  "resources
organized  as"  out  of  this  phrase,  asking  what  these  words
contribute  to the meaning.  Their  intended role is to direct
attention away  from SMEs considered as a collection of actual
economic  actors,  and  toward  the  possibilities  of  small  and
medium enterprise as a form (or  range of forms) in which certain
types of economic resources might be effectively organized.
Again, some consideration of rejected alternatives may help
to  clarify  the  intention.  A  policy  of providing  SMEs with
1 This judgment is supported by a brief  argument  in the
appendix to this essay.8
improved access to finance can be construed as one that seeks to
help individual enterprises (in the service of the higher level
goal of development).  Assessment of the impact of such a policy
might produce the apparently discouraging conclusion that many
SMEs  are  beyond  help:  with  or  without  improved  access  to
finance, their chances  for long-term survival are low.  This
would seem to imply a negative assessment of the policy --  if
one accepts the critical assumption that the effect on long-term
survival is an appropriate performance measure.
The suggestion here is that this assumption is simplistic:
a deeper analysis is needed.  On the face of it, survival data
for  enterprises  of  a  particular  sort  say  nothing  about  the
viability of that form of enterprise; newly formed businesses
generally replace the failures.  Neither do the survival data
necessarily reflect adversely on the effectiveness of the form
as a way of organizing resources, or even on the social return
to the  particular investments  made by failing firms.  Of course,
if  there  were  evidence  showing  that  incremental  financial
resources  supplied  in  the  interests  of  development  were
systematically dissipated in operating losses or merely funded
a temporary increase in consumption, this would indeed imply a
negative assessment of the policy.  But the ultimate occurrence
of a business failure does not, as a matter of logic, imply that
the life  of  that business  was  "a waste"  in  either  of  these
significant  senses.  The  strength of the association between
business life spans and the extent of the economic contribution9
over  the  life  span  is  an  empirical  question,  and  the
investigation of that question requires careful attention to the
measurement of economic contribution.
in  developing  countries.:  This is intended to be non-
committal regarding the potential  field of application of any
policies that might be developed, the idea being to avoid the
premature imposition of design constraints.  As noted above, it
is not a  foregone conclusion that good policy  options of the
indicated  type  actually  exist;  still  less  is  it a  foregone
conclusion that options exist that meet additional criteria --
such  as  general  applicability  across  countries  and  economic
sectors.  Although  the  scope  of  potential  application  is  a
legitimate concern, the time to confront it is when  (and if)
there  is a  portfolio  of  focused, credible policy  options  in
existence.  At that point, an approach to the scope problem that
involves mixing, matching and extending the identified options
may produce a result that is markedly superior to what could be
achieved if the policy design process were constrained from the
start to produce individual options of broad scope.
The measure of the practical  importance of this point  is
the  enormous diversity  and  scale  of the  category  "small and
medium  enterprise."  If  the  process  of  designing  new  Bank
initiatives in this area is a process that is strongly oriented
to using  Bank resources effectively, then the breadth of the
field  suggests  that  it  should  be  relatively  easy  to  find
policies  that are promising:  policy  designs  can  exploit  the10
opportunity to (in various metaphors)  "cherry pick,"  "skim the
cream"  and  "seek  out  the  low-hanging  fruit  first."  By
contrast, even rather weak design commitments to promoting SMEs
qenerically may easily lead to policy options that are fatally
lacking in focus and operational discipline, and susceptible to
having  the  merits  of  valid  core  ideas  obscured  by
undiscriminating application.
On  the  relevant  economics.  This  discussion  attends
particularly to issues that are illuminated  by transactions cost
economics  (e.g., Williamson  (1985)), evolutionary  economics
(e.g., Nelson  and  Winter  (1982)) and  the  "new institutional
economics" more  generally  (e.g., North  (1990)).  It is also
significantly informed by organizational ecology  (e.g.,  Hannan
and Freeman (1989)),  a field of inquiry with roots in sociology
but whose  substantive  interests lie quite  close  to  those of
evolutionary economics.  All of these approaches have important
things  to  offer  to  the  discussion  of  policy  toward  SMEs,
especially  when  these  contributions  are  considered  as  a
complement or critique of what a more mainstream economic view
might suggest.
The great service performed by transaction cost economics
is  that  it  breathes  the  life  of  realistic  detail  into  the
abstract analytical category of "markets".  More precisely, it
performs that service for the more general category of "exchange
relations": one of the first consequences of the encounter with
more realistic detail is that the concept of a  market loses some11
of the luster that the economics textbooks have long conferred
upon it.
On  a  narrow  interpretation,  a  market  is an  institution
where similar price terms for numerous transactions in more-or-
less  homogeneous  commodities  emerge  from  more-or-less
simultaneous searches for advantageous  prices conducted by more-
or-less  numerous  buyers  and  sellers.  Although  the  world
contains many examples of these more-or-less textbook markets,
it  does  not  contain  nearly  enough  to  warrant  an  exclusive
concern  with  such  markets  when  addressing  the  problems  of
economic organization.  At the other extreme,  "market" may be
construed so broadly as to cover a large portion of all exchange
relations, including the  very large class of long-term bilateral
relations  in  which  a  rough  calculus  of  sequential  barter
replaces price.  It is not clear where the outermost limits of
"market" lie according to the broad construction; for example,
is  marriage  included?  What  is  clear  is  that  analysis  of
textbook  markets  provides  an  inadequate  basis  for  the
understanding of this broader field of exchange relations, and
transaction  cost  economics  has  made  substantial  progress  in
filling the gap.
Overall,  the  economic  contexts  of  SMEs  in  developing
countries are obviously very diverse.  Where  textbook markets
are  involved,  policy  attention  naturally  tends  to  focus  on
whether  the  prices  formed  in  those  markets  are  socially
appropriate, both in terms of their performance of the rationing12
function  and  in  terms  of  the  incentive  signals provided  to
enterprises.  But many  other types of exchange relations are
also  involved.  In  those  cases,  the  TCE  viewpoint  directs
attention to the question of who or what is on the other side of
the relationship, and how  the relationship is governed.  The
answer to the governance question is presumed to be specific to
the transaction: it depends on transaction  attributes and on the
parties as well as on broader features of the social context,
such  as  the  functioning  of  the  formal  legal  system.  It is
recognized that the  parties typically have choices to make about
governance,  just  as  they  do  about  other  aspects  of  the
transaction.  Also --  closely related to the governance issues
--  the TCE perspective directs attention to the full range of
transaction attributes in which the parties may have a stake;
there is often a lot more going on than simply a payment of P x
Q in exchange for quantity Q.
Evolutionary  economics  illuminates  the  scene  from  a
different  angle.  Like  transaction  cost  economics,  it  finds
challenge and support in probing to a level of detail  that is
not reached by standard theoretical categories.  In this case,
however, the categories pushed aside are not primarily those of
market  exchange,  but  those  that  characterize  production
possibilities.  The  language  of  production  functions  and
production sets gives way to the language of firm capabilities
and an account of their sources in organizational routines --  or
to  the  closely  related  dialect  of  firm  "capabilities"  and13
"competencies"  that  is  now  much  in  favor  in  the  business
strategy literature. 2 Understanding the processes of change in
firm  capabilities  is the main  task, but  the  quest  for  this
understanding  ranges  widely  across  levels  of  analysis  and
encounters a  multitude of individual issues --  from learning and
retention of skills by individual workers and the character of
the knowledge embedded in organizations through the "life  cycle"
patterns  of  industries  and  product  markets  to  the  roles  of
government laboratories and universities.
A number of different dynamic mechanisms are involved in
the  change  of  firm  capabilities.  In  the  large,  and  on
historical  time  scales, there is a  readily discernable  trend
toward an expansion of the capabilities of firms in general.  It
can be  argued  --  as  Schumpeter  (1934)  in fact  did  --  that  this
is what  "economic development" is all about.  The underlying
mechanisms, however, admit decline as well as advance.  As the
phenomena are studied on shorter time scales and in  more detail;
it  becomes  very  easy  to  identify  episodes,  locales,  and
particular  firms or sectors where capabilities have declined.
This fact may be puzzling if one is accustomed to thinking of
technology in very abstract terms --  as  "information" that is
non-rivalrous in use,  storable and transferrable at zero cost,
and a catalyst rather than a constituent of conventional inputs.
It is not at all puzzling if one thinks of capability  in more
2  The  intensity  of  this  interest  is  measured  by  the
reception accorded Prahalad and Hamel (1990)  --  now the all-time
most requested reprint of the Harvard Business Review.14
concrete terms.  For example, it is obvious that in many types
of  organizations  (including  football  teams  and  economics
departments), capabilities at a given time are largely accounted
for by the associated personnel at that time: if the best people
leave, the organization can no longer do what it did before.
Among  the  dynamic  mechanisms  shaping  the  evolution  of
capabilities, selection plays a key role.  Selection operates at
different  levels, and can take more  than one form at a given
level.  The principal emphasis in the literature thus far has
been on selection at the level of specific business practices
(routines) and at the level of firms.  Routines become more or
less  prevalent  in  the  population  of  business  firms  partly
because they are adopted or rejected by individual firms, and
partly as an indirect consequence of firm-level selection (that
is, whether  firms  committed  to  the routine  are  collectively
faring well or poorly).  Firm-level selection dynamics involve
both the processes that change the roster  (entry  and exit) and
differential growth of firms on the roster at a given time.
Thus,  for  example,  a  routine with  a  powerful  favorable
effect on competitive strength tends to become more prevalent
because  (i) it  is  adopted  (imitated) by  firms  that  did  not
previously  employ  it  (ii) few firms that have adopted it are
likely to abandon it, (iii)  new entrants are likely to perceive
its value  and adopt  it initially,  (iv) few established  firms
that have adopted it will fail, (v) firms that have adopted it15
are  likely  to grow  faster  than  those  that  have  not,  and  to
expand the application of the routine as they grow.
There  are  numerous  points  of  contact  between  these
evolutionary  economics  ideas  and  the  problems  of  small  and
medium  enterprise.  While differential growth  is the dominant
form  in  which  selection  forces  are  expressed  among  larger
enterprises,  birth  and  death  processes  play  a  much  more
significant  role  at  the  lower end of  the size  distribution.
Better  understanding  of  the  economic  significance  of  these
processes  is therefore an  important requisite  of good policy
design.  As  suggested  above  under  the  heading  resources
organized  as  small  and medium  enterprises,  it  is  facile  to
assume  that  high  birth  and  death  rates  of  enterprises  are
necessarily  indicative  of  an  institutional  malfunction.
Discouraging demographics at the firm level do not rule out the
possibility that the overall performance of SMEs in a particular
sector of a particular economy is improving rapidly.  In fact,
rapid  advance via  strong  selection  at the  level  of routines
could have turbulence at the firm level (high  entry and exit) as
its logical corollary, granting only the plausible premise that
it is easier to establish new practices in new enterprises than
it is  to overthrow and  replace  established practices  in old
enterprises.  On the other hand, part of the interest in policy
initiatives  involving  SMEs derives  from  the vision  that,  at
least occasionally, minor and correctable flaws in the policy
context may be killing off firms whose youth, small scale and16
shaky financial condition belie  the enormous contributions in
employment and value-creation that they are capable of making  . 3
Thus,  there  are  multiple  images  of  what  a  successfully
developing population of SMEs might look like.  This fact poses
challenges to the  measurement of success, both in general and in
the context of assessing policy impacts.
In  addition  to  transaction  cost  economics  in  the
Coase/Williamson  tradition  and  a  portion  of  the  field  of
evolutionary  economics,  the  new  institutional  economics
comprises such areas as the property rights literature, the work
of economic historians who focus on institutional change, and
more formal analyses concerned with the emergence of standards,
norms  and conventions.  Of the many  issues addressed in this
broad field, a subset of particular importance here relates to
the  role  of  the  informal  sector.  All  countries  have  such
"underground  economies" in  which participants seek to  avoid some
aspect of governmental involvement in the transaction --  be it
taxation, licensing, regulation or the outright prohibition of
the transaction  itself.  And,  in all  such cases, there  is a
somewhat  hazy  boundary  zone  separating  truly  "underground"
operations from the many  firms of the formal  sector that cut
corners occasionally.
3  A striking example from recent  U.S. experience is the case
of Sun Microsystems, which  in its early days had to "bet the
company"  on  an  all-out  effort  to  establish  its  technical
credibility in the marketplace --  making a single deal that not
only gave away much of its product, but also  (apparently)  much
of its proprietary  technology.  Five years after making  that
deal, Sun was in the Fortune 500.17
In many  developing  countries, however,  the firms  in the
informal sector seem to play a relatively  larger role in the
total  economy,  to  be  more  thoroughly  isolated  from  the
institutional structure of the formal sector, and to be more
likely to be engaged in activities that would be legitimate but
for that distancing from the formal sector.  In general, firms
in the  informal sector enjoy  cost advantages associated with
freedom from taxation and regulation, but suffer some offsetting
disadvantages.  The  latter  may  include  lack  of  access  to
whatever  institutional support the formal system provides  for
protection of  property, dispute settlement, finance and so forth
--  but more  fundamentally, such a  firm has  to "keep its head
down"  to remain quasi-invisible to the official system.  That
requirement  by  itself would  seem to rule  out not  only  large
size, but  also rapid growth  through replication  of a  success
formula, as well as close relations with individual firms of the
formal sector, including foreign firms.  These implications, if
correct,  suggest  a  pessimistic  assessment  of  the  potential
contributions of the informal sector.  This is especially so if
the assessment  is done  from an evolutionary perspective,  for
evolutionary economics stresses the idiosyncratic and context-
dependent  character  of  the  routines  that  individual  firms
create, the desirability of experimentation, and the importance
of firm growth driven by replication of success.  If a wall at
the edge of the formal sector precludes  that kind of growth,
much of the benefit of experimentation may be lost.18
Policy Principles: A First Cut
I turn now to a preliminary characterization of a response
to  the  question  framed  at  the  start  of  this  essay.  Some
features of this response have been intimated in the discussion
above,  and  in  the  framing  of  the  question  itself.  The
feasibility  and  desirability  of  this  sort  of  response  is
affirmed here as a working hypothesis --  something to be tested
first through discussion based on existing knowledge, a sample
of which is provided below.  If judged promising at that stage,
it could be pursued through new research.
In this connection, I should re-emphasize that the policy
principles  are offered by way of background  for the research
guidance:  useful research is research that tests and refines
some  tentative  commitments  about  policy  directions.  Some
suggestions for this sort of research are offered at the end of
this essay.  Farther down the road, it should be possible to use
data gathered in the course of implementation to strengthen the
supporting research effort.
1)  Leverage through learning.  Because the Bank's resources
are small compared to the aggregate "needs" of SMEs throughout
the developing world, there is an obvious need for a strategy to
guide the deployment of available resources in directions that
provide  maximum  leverage.  The  strategy  should  take  full
advantage of the Bank's freedom to take a broad and long view
when designing and implementing policy initiatives, and should19
allow the Bank's own implementation competencies to evolve  in
tandem with the initiatives themselves.
A  credible  centerpiece  for  the  formulation  of  such  a
strategy is the question:  What  are the enterprises  involved
going  to  learn  as  a  result  of  the  Bank's  activities?  In
pursuing this course, the Bank would in effect attempt to help
the SMEs of the developing world to do what many firms of the
advanced countries are increasingly trying to do for themselves
--  to capture the learning benefits from their activities today,
the better  to build  their  opportunities  for  tomorrow.  The
consequences of learning are typically difficult to quantify in
financial terms, partly because of the inevitable weakness of
property rights relating to knowledge.  That very fact is one of
the  considerations  that  commends  learning  to  the  Bank's
attention.
There  is a  kinship between  this proposal  and  the  long-
familiar  case  for  public  subsidy  of  science,  and  of  basic
science in particular.  The kinship is real, and derives from
the important core of truth in the idea that information is  non-
rivalrous in use  -- and in this sense has high leverage as a
fundamental characteristic. 4 But there are equally important
distinctions.  Enterprises  do  not  learn  to  perform  specific
economic  roles  by  subscribing  to  academic  science  and
engineering  journals,  or  to  the business  press,  or  even  by
4  See Romer  (1993)  for an essay on development explicating
and emphasizing this point.20
observing from afar the behavior of other  firms.  They  learn
chiefly by doing, or attempting to do, something quite specific
in a specific context.  The kind of learning that supports the
economic activity of an enterprise integrates much more of human
understanding than is available within the limits of any single
discipline,  though  by  academic  standards  the  components
integrated may be highly  imperfect.  The issue of "absorptive
capacity" is fundamental to  understanding firms'  limited ability
to  learn  from  sources  other  than  their  own  accumulated
experience:  whatever the learning experience is, you have  to
command  the  prerequisites  to  benefit  from  it  (Cohen  and
Levinthal,  1990).  (A closely  related point  is made  by  the
"Velcro theory  of  learning": it takes both  sides  to make  it
stick.)  In the end, learning is something that individuals and
organizations  have  to  do  for  themselves  --  but  opportunity,
context and incentives may be subject to external influence.
2) Selectivity  and  focus.  The  Bank,  as a  single  large
actor  on the world  scene, faces obvious problems  in pursuing
policies that seek to  mobilize enormous numbers of small actors.
A part of the solution to this problem in the past has been to
act  through  intermediaries,  such  as  commercial  banks  or
government-funded promotional institutions; certainly the  use of
intermediaries of some type is likely to be a  feature of any
future  policy  as  well.  There  is,  however,  another  general
approach  to cutting  the potential  client  population  down  to
size:  establish  criteria,  grounded  in  the  Bank's  basic21
strategy, that restrict the range of enterprises that the Bank
tries to reach.  Within the field defined by these criteria, the
Bank  could  attempt  to  identify  the  projects  that  are  most
promising and focus on these, at least initially.  Finally, it
could  support  projects  addressed  to  groups  of  enterprises
defined by such characteristics as size, geographical region and
industry or sector --  an approach  that would  be effective in
proportion to the closeness of the causal linkage between these
identifying  characteristics and  the  leverage created  for the
Bank's resources.
The key issue here  is whether the vast  field of SMEs  in
developing  countries  is construed  chiefly  as  a  field  toward
which the Bank has a diffuse moral obligation, or whether it is
more like an opportunity set that the Bank can search for the
best matches to particular policy ideas.  If the former, then
the large size of the field is clearly a burdensome liability,
but if the latter the size of the field is at least potentially
an asset.
To  the  extent  that  the  Bank  succeeds  in  producing  a
coherent economic rationale and strategy supporting its policy
toward  SMEs,  to  that  same  extent  it  will  have  produced  an
implicit definition of "technical merit" in a project proposal:
placed alongside the strategy statement, some projects will look
better than others.  In project selection, "technical merit" as
thus defined will inevitably be seen as conflicting with other
considerations --  values not fully addressed by the strategy,22
plus political  and bureaucratic considerations.  Compromises,
some of them quite defensible, will no doubt occur.
It  would  be  helpful  if  that  inevitable  process  of
compromise could be deferred until the strategy is defined and,
and even until is has been examined and re-defined after there
has been an opportunity to study initial implementation.  Only
at that stage does it become possible to say what is at stake in
a  compromise.  To advocate selectivity and focus as a policy
principle is to urge the importance of conducting the search for
a coherent strategy without carrying extra baggage implicit in
the  likelihood  of  future  compromise.  If  the  principle  of
selectivity and focus is accepted, the field of SME activity in
developing countries can be viewed as an opportunity set.
3) Strengthen linkage.  In exercising the design  freedom
conferred by selectivity, the Bank should be guided by the idea
of strengthening linkage.  This principle directs attention to
those SMEs that might be said to constitute the extensive margin
of the global division of labor.  The paradigm case is of an
enterprise  that  might,  but  currently  cannot,  qualify  as  a
supplier to a multinational corporation.  If Bank policy could
assist  such an enterprise  to move  across  that threshold, the
sought-after learning benefits would follow from the experience
of engagement with the world economy and, in many cases, from
the efforts of the customer to bring the supplier up to global
standards.  (Such efforts are  increasingly recognized  as  an
important aspect  of  supply management  by  large corporations;23
this is especially so when, as in the case of many developing
country  SMEs,  the potential  supplier  offers  the  competitive
advantage  of low unit cost, but  is afflicted with  offsetting
disadvantages because of quality problems and unfamiliarity with
customer procedures.)
Adjacent  to that paradigm  case stand a variety of other
cases:  firms whose linkage to the global economy derives from
their role as suppliers to the firm of the paradigm case.  Those
firms will benefit if the paradigm firm prospers, but also, the
paradigm firm will benefit if Bank policy somehow improves the
performance of its supplier base.  Learning can certainly flow
both ways  in supply chains; in developing  countries the most
promising sources of leverage come from upstream flows through
their product markets, and downstream flows from their capital
goods  suppliers.  Frequently,  the large customer can help  to
play  a  role  in  that  downstream  flow  as well,  relating,  for
example, the specifications needed  in the firm's equipment to
the  specifications  the  customer  requires  in  the products  it
buys.
There is a distinguishable second sense in which linkage
might serve as a guiding principle: linkage is stronger for SMEs
that are easier for Bank policy to reach.  Of course, it may be
possible  to devise  innovative ways  to reach enterprises  that
appear difficult to reach.  But if they are truly difficult to
reach in the sense that significant amounts of scarce resources
are  required  to  extend  the  Bank's  reach,  the  selectivity24
principle suggests that those resources be applied instead  where
the linkage is stronger to begin with.
As development progresses,  the ability of SMEs to play  a
significant role in development depends on a wider set of market
and non-market linkages --  to education and training from both
domestic and foreign universities, to foreign firms considered
as technology  sources,  to government  and/or  private  research
organizations.  These  linkages  are  appropriate  concerns  for
firms that already have a basic understanding of the functioning
and requirements of the global marketplace; it is not clear that
there  is  an  effective  role  here  for  Bank  programs  directed
specifically at SMEs.
Empirical  Observations  on the Role of SMEs --  From Data Relating
Mostly to the U.S. and Other Advanced Countries
Job Creation.  In developing and advanced countries alike,
policy attention to small and medium enterprises has long been
advocated on the ground that SMEs are a particularly effective
vehicle  for  expanding  employment.  There  was  not,  to  my
knowledge,  any time when  this assessment even appeared  to be
firmly grounded in careful empirical research.  Rather, it seems
to have been derived by extrapolation from a handful of facts;
careful  attention  to  the  problems  of  interpretation  that
intervene between those facts and the  policy conclusion was long
deferred.  Recently  the  pendulum  has  swung;  the  careful
attention that was lacking has now been given, and the argument25
that SMEs are distinctly effective in creating jobs turns out to
be full of holes.
The strongest empirical evidence on the question comes from
advanced countries, where the data are strongest.  However, an
important  step  in  the development  of  that  evidence  was  the
identification of the flaws in the statistical logic underlying
the prevailing misconceptions;  those flaws are as relevant to
the  interpretation  of  limited  or  impressionistic  data  from
developing countries as they are to the situation in advanced
countries.  And while many valid contrasts can be drawn between
the SMEs of developing and advanced countries, most of these do
not relate to the key issues of the job creation discussion.  In
that  specific  area,  available  data  suggest  strong  parallels
rather  than contrasts  --  although  one important exception  to
this generalization will be noted subsequently.
Recent  work  by  Davis,  Haltiwanger  and  Schuh  (1993) has
clarified  the  issues  of  statistical  logic  and presented  the
empirical evidence for the U.S..  In their critique of the now-
fading  conventional  wisdom,5 they  identify  three  issues  of
statistical  logic.  First,  there  is  the distinction  between
gross  and  net  job  creation.  Although  small businesses  are
disproportionate  creators  of  new  jobs,  they  are  also
5  The  "conventional wisdom"  was  expressed  in  its  most
elaborated form in the work of David Birch  (1979, 1987) and in
statements of the U.S. Small Business Administration.  However,
as Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh point out, the central idea has
been put forward repeatedly by a wide range of opinion leaders.
For  illustrative evidence of  the fading  of  this wisdom,  see
Nassar, 1994.26
disproportionate  destroyers  of  jobs,  partly  because  the
businesses  themselves  have  higher  failure rates.  Secondly,
there is the familiar regression fallacy.  Since there are some
transitorv causes of measured employment size in a given year
are  (such as measurement error), there is a tendency for firms
that are particularly large in one year to shrink in subsequent
years, and similarly for small firms to grow.  This pattern may
appear  even  though, over  longer  time periods,  no  systematic
relationship between  size and employment growth  exists.  The
regression  fallacy  interacts with,  and  exacerbates,  a  third
source of interpretive error: the use of broad size categories
defined by base-year  size.  Under  such a measurement  scheme,
some  of  the  growth  in  "small  firm  employment"  over  a  year
reflects  the shrinkage of  formerly medium-sized  firms.  With
this sort of  migration among categories, job creation can appear
to be concentrated in the smaller categories even when firm-by-
firm  analysis  would  show  job  creation  to  be  a  strictly
increasing function of size.  6
If  these  analytical  errors  are  avoided,  what  is  the
implication for the role of SMEs in job creation?  For the U.S.
manufacturing sector, the work of Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh
points to the following conclusions.  First, gross rates of job
creation and destruction are high in both small and large firms,
but higher in the small firm categories than in the large.  In
6  See Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, Box 2, for a numerical
example of this point.27
the U.S. manufacturing  sector, large  (> 500 employees)  firms
account for the bulk of employment, and this fact turns out to
dominate  the  calculation  of  "net job  creation"  in  terms  of
absolute numbers.  In terms of rates, no clear tendency emerges
for net  job creation  rates  to vary  systematically  with  firm
size;  there  is little  reason  to think  that net  job creation
would be much different if a given segment of economic activity
were organized as 50 firms of about 20 employees instead of as
single firm of 1000 employees.
Large firms do offer greater job stability, and there is a
substantial body  of evidence that, in the U.S., employees  in
large firms fare better in terms of wages and other dimensions
of the employment relation.  This is true in general, as well as
in  manufacturing specifically.  While the interpretation of this
pattern  remains a  matter  of dispute,  the difficulty  lies  in
excluding explanations, not in generating plausible ones.  In
particular, the evolutionary viewpoint leads immediately to the
observation  that large  firms  tend to be  ones  that have  long
track  records  of  relative  success.  That  point  plus  the
assumption of some imperfection in any of the markets for labor,
financial capital or information provides the foundation of a
whole family of explanations of the observed pattern.
The relevance of these various points to the situation in
less  developed  countries  is  variable  and  in  some  respects
uncertain.  There is little reason to doubt the transferability
of the  logical critique of  the view  of  SMEs as job-creation28
engines, nor is there an empirical case that makes these logical
points less relevant.  While the demographics of populations of
business firms is harder to study in developing countries, most
generalizations  offered on the subject seem to correspond  to
what is found in advanced countries.  These demographic issues
are  further  discussed  below;  but  to  the  extent  that,  for
example,  enterprise  mortality  is  a  factor  in  gross  job
destruction  in SMEs advanced countries,  the same point  seems
likely  to  be  relevant  to  LDCs.  The  observations  regarding
superior job stability, wages  and so forth may be  subject to
more serious qualification: in  many cases, the large enterprises
of LDCs may not reflect the outcome of  protracted testing in the
marketplace, but may  instead be  the products  of some  form of
state intervention.
Before leaving the subject  of job creation, it is important
to  note  that  the  merits  of  job  creation  as  a  micro-level
criterion for policy interventions are far from obvious, quite
apart from the question of whether SMEs have special virtue in
this regard.  Financial assistance guided at the sub-project
level by the criterion of minimizing "investment cost per job"
could easily be destructive of economy-wide employment even in
the  short  term,  depending  on  the  balance  of  such  indirect
mechanisms as where the "new" employees are actually drawn from,29
and what activities the incremental output competes with. 7 In
the longer term, efforts to advance employment goals in lieu of
productivity  and  efficiency  goals  could  easily  have  adverse
consequences for employment.  For example, scarce capital may be
shifted toward firms with lower potential growth rates and hence
lower employment offerings in the future.
Firm Demographics.  The statistical  patterns of firm "birth
and death" or "entry  and exit" have been examined from two quite
different perspectives.  From one perspective, the patterns are
viewed  as  quasi-equilibrium  phenomena  in  the sense  that  net
change in firm populations  is assumed to be small and to have
cyclical  features  or  a  modest  secular  trend.  While  it may
display  variation  it  is not  expected  to display  significant
patterns of its own.  In the other perspective, changes in firm
populations are seen as aspects of the dynamic development of a
particular product market, industry or sector --  and the large
scale patterns of change are a major focus of attention, often
the major  focus of attention.  Interestingly, this particular
7  A  mid-80s  review  of  World  Bank  lending  to  small
enterprises offers a confident assertion that lending to small
scale industry had generated jobs at lower investment cost than
larger industrial projects in the same country (Levitsky, 1986,
p.  7).  The  subsequent  discussion,  however,  introduces  one
consideration after another that  would provide grounds for doubt
that the overall employment consequences would necessarily be
favorable.  Since the bulk of the data is drawn from sub-loan
applications, not checked against ex post  outcomes  (p. 9), a
skeptic might  even find reason to doubt that the policy lever
that was pushed actually moved in the intended manner, much less
that the consequences of its movement were the intended ones.30
difference  of  perspective  is  something  that  cuts  across  a
variety of other significant differences in approach, such as
distinctions between disciplines (economics  and sociology), and
between descriptive and highly theory-driven analysis.
Among empirically-oriented scholars of economic growth, it
has long been recognized that the growth process is one in  which
the baton of growth  leadership is repeatedly passed  from one
sector  to  another.  This  pattern  is  evident  not  only  when
sectors are defined in aggregative terms (as  in the agriculture,
manufacturing, services sequence)  but also for industries within
sectors, for segments of industries within industries, and for
narrowly  defined  product  markets.  Indeed,  in  contemporary
jargon one might  express this by saying  that growth patterns
display  a  sort  of  fractal  geometry.  Qualitatively  similar
patterns are seen across a range of scales; when magnified, the
small details of the large-scale low-resolution  picture are seen
to resemble the original large-scale picture.
Changes  in  the sectoral  locus  of growth  leadership  are
manifested in firm demographics in a number of ways.  The most
striking of these, certainly, is the typical severity of the
"shakeout" --  the sharp decline in the number of producers that
often occurs in its third or fourth decade.  (Gort and Klepper,
1982; Klepper  and Graddy,  1990).  For  example, an observer
familiar with the U.S. telephone or automobile industry only in
recent decades may be unaware of the fact that the stones in the
industry graveyards  show the names  of literally  thousands of31
former  producers.  While most of these were very small and known
only  to  local  markets,  some  hundreds  were  more  substantial
firms  .8
It is  not still not well understood why shakeouts occur and
why they vary dramatically in extent --  sometimes the number of
producers declines by a very large percentage,  sometimes by a
moderate percentage, and sometimes hardly at all.  One possible
line of explanation points to such factors as the over-optimism
of entrants, or flawed assessment of opportunities in possible
niche markets, or  misjudgment of the timing of entry relative to
the stage of the business  cycle.  In a mature  market,  these
factors probably do play important roles; also, of course, the
strength of large incumbent firms is a major factor in creating
an  inhospitable  environment  for  new  entrants.  In  a  new
industry, however, something much more fundamental to growth is
going  on--  the  quest  for  product  designs  and  supporting
production processes, that effectively bridge  the gap between
customer needs and technological possibilities.  The  definition
of the industry (or segment or product) is at stake.  There is
massive experimentation followed by massive selection.  Because
imitation is a major factor in the competitive  process, the  many
8  It should be noted that these large counts do not include
firms merely  associated with  the industry as, e.g., parts  or
service companies.  The telephone organizations  (not all for-
profit) provided telephone service to multiple subscribers, the
automobile companies produced and sold whole automobiles (or,  at
least, horseless carriages).32
failures of the experimenting firms do not necessarily imply the
failures of their experiments.
The  reality  of  the  patterns  studied  in  the  dynamic
development perspective is not open to serious dispute; there
are  too many well-studied  examples.  But since  those studies
have  typically  focused  on  the  first  few  decades  in  the
development of a particular product markets or industry, they do
not themselves provide a direct approach to the general question
of  how  patterns  in  firm  demographics  relate  to  the  general
functioning of the economy.  It is possible that the aggregate
picture  is dominated  quantitatively  by  what  is happening  in
mature markets; alternatively, it is possible that the dynamic
phenomena  are  important  enough  to  distort  any  analysis  of
sectoral  or  aggregate  data  that  does  not  attend  to  their
existence.'  The  issue here  is quantitative, but an adequate
resolution would have to deal with large number of conceptual
and measurement issues, including the operational definition of
a  "mature" market  and  the  problem  presented  by  the belated
adjustment of industrial classification schemes to new forms of
activity. In any case, the literature does not seem to provide
much insight into this question.
9 Although not directly concerned with firm demographics,
the  job  creation  study  of  Davis,  Haltiwanger  and  Schuh,
discussed above, is subject to similar distortion.  It gives no
attention to the possibility that the aggregate patterns of job
creation and destruction in small and large firms might be bound
up  with  historical  patterns  of  development  --  other  than
referring to the point that the limitation of their data to the
manufacturing sector might be a significant one.33
With that issue left unresolved, the  "stylized facts" of
firm demographics can be sorted into two categories, the clearly
dynamic ones  like the shakeout and  everything else.  In the
latter  category,  some  unknown  mixture  of  quasi-equilibrium
"turbulence" and the consequences of dynamic change produce the
following patterns.  Small  firms tend  to have  short  average
lifetimes.  Liquidation, rather than acquisition or other change
of  legal  form,  is  the  overwhelmingly  important  mode  of
disappearance of small firms.  Rates of disappearance relative
to  the  current  population  (hazard rates)  at  a  given  age
decrease with size, and quite abruptly so in the smallest size
ranges.  Survivors  in  a  given  cohort  of  entrants  tend  to
increase in average size.  Gross rates of entry into an industry
tend to be large relatively to net rates, but much more so in
some industries than in others.
Quantitatively, many of these effects are quite impressive
in the sense that economists unfamiliar with this empirical area
often react to the facts with shock.  A high-quality data set on
Wisconsin  firms with  one  or more  employees  for  1978-86 was
created by Neuendorf and Shaffer, and its age-size relationships
analyzed  with  sophisticated  tools  by  Pakes  and  Ericson
(undated).  Looking  at  the  1979  birth  cohort  of  327
manufacturing firms, it turns out that over 50% of these firms
had liquidated by 1986; however, the mean  (employment) size of
survivors at the end was 2.7 times larger than the mean size of
the original cohort, so jobs were  "created" by the cohort at a34
rate in excess of 3.5% per year  in spite of the attrition in
firm numbers.  In retailing, the corresponding figures are over
60% attrition  through liquidation, and growth by a  factor  of
only  about 1.6,  so there was net  job  loss.  Since retailing
entrants were substantially  more numerous and slightly larger  at
birth, the employment in the cohort declined in the two sectors
combined at a rate of 3.7% per year.
Similar patterns have been found in  a variety of data sets.
Dunne,  Roberts  and  Samuelson  (1988) reported  an  extensive
analysis of entry and exit into 387 manufacturing industries,
using data from the Census of Manufactures.  Here,  "entry" and
"exit" refer not to the birth or death  (liquidation) of firms,
but  to their appearance  and disappearance  from an industry." 0
Averaging rates across 387 four-digit SIC industries they found,
for example, exit rates over the five  year inter-census interval
to be over  50% regardless of the type of entry  (new firm or
diversifying); over ten year intervals the cumulative rates are
all above  65%.  Persistent industry effects are prominent  in
virtually all measures considered; for example, across 20 two-
digit industries the  average market share of entrants correlates
with  the  average market  share  of exiters  at  the  level  .92.
Across  the 387 industries, intertemporal correlations of exit
rates  are  substantial  even  over  long  time  intervals;  for
example, the exit rate over 1977-82 correlates with  that over
10 Also, ownership changes do not produce entries or exits
under the definitions used by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson.35
the  1963-67  period  at  .58  --  and  this  is  the  maximum  range
correlation that the data allow.  A similar  pattern, though less
pronounced, exists on the entry rate side.  The persistence of
industry effects over long periods seems to indicate both  the
importance of continuing turbulence as a factor in the general
patterns  and  also  the  industry-specific  character  of  major
determinants  of  turbulence  --  but  a  fifteen  or  twenty  year
period is not quite long enough by industry life cycle standards
to make  this  judgment  secure.  After  correction  for  fixed
industry effects, one gets  the expected  negative correlation
between  entry  and  exit  rates  over  any  given  inter-census
interval: there are good times and bad times, and they do not
occur simultaneously in all industries.  Good times favor entry
and depress exit; bad times do the reverse.
One apparent contrast between the Wisconsin data and the
Census  Bureau  data  involves  to  the  size  of  survivors  in  a
particular cohort relative to overall average firm size.  Five
years after entry, the Census Bureau data indicate a value in
the  30%  - 40%  range,  while  the  corresponding  value  in  the
Wisconsin data is around 15%.  However, the Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson  definition  of  entry  includes  entry  by  established
firms from other industries, which  tend to be larger  (even in
the newly-entered  industry alone)  than new  firms.  Also,  the
size measures are different  (employment in Wisconsin, value of
output in the Census Bureau data).36
In an study addressing much the same issues in the context
of a developing country, Behrman and Deolalikar (1989)  analyzed
the survival of medium and large manufacturing establishments in
Indonesia  over  the  period  1975-85.11  Their  data  included  all
manufacturing establishments with 20 or more employees in 1975.
This range excludes the smallest and most vulnerable firms; in
the Wisconsin data it corresponds to excluding almost two-thirds
of  the  firms.  Nevertheless,  Behrman  and  Deolalikar  report
failure rates that "seem striking":  the mean years of survival
after  1975 is  6.4, and  only about  45%  of the establishments
survived through 1985.  As in other data sets, both age and size
are positively related to survival, as are operation in a heavy
industry sector, and productivity (value  added/employee).  Among
ownership  forms,  the  corporate-or-partnership  ownership  form
shows lower expected survival than individual or cooperative-
owned establishments when other variables are controlled.  This
might be attributable to the application of a more rigorously
economic  survival  test,  in  particular,  one  that  captures
opportunity  cost  considerations  more  completely.  Finally,
foreign  equity  participation  is  significantly  favorable  to
"  Although  the  running head  of  their  article  is  "Firm
Survival  Duration  in  a  Developing  Country,"  Behrman  and
Deolalikar  refer  only  to  establishments  in  the  text.  The
relationship  between firm survival  and establishment survival --
including  the question  of whether  an  establishment  death  is
recorded when a single-establishment firm changes location --  is
not discussed.  It is likely, however, that disappearances of
establishments from the survey do reflect firm deaths  in most
cases,  except  for  the  largest  establishments  --  where
disappearances are rare in any case.37
survival,  but  government  equity  participation  is  not.  In
general,  these  various  results  reveal  a  broad  picture  in  a
developing  country  that is consistent with  the patterns  that
have been identified in advanced countries.
Networks and Other Frameworks.  One conclusion that seems
to emerge from a variety of sources is this: for a given amount
of activity organized in SMEs, the level of economic success and
dynamism achieved is roughly  proportional to the degree to  which
the enterprises are embedded in institutional support systems
"one  level up".  This  proposition  emerged as  a  product  of
empirical research and inductive reasoning, guided in  particular
by  interest  in  understanding  some  prominent  examples  of
successful networks of small firms.  "2  But, in this case as in
many others, theory can respond to the challenge of cleaning up
after empiricism, finding the logic of the issue or the  pattern
once it is pointed out.
There are two parts  to the theoretical story here.  The
first part  involves identifying an abstract theoretical world
where the networking phenomenon does not make sense --  a case
analogous  to  Ronald  Coase's  theoretical  baseline  of  zero
transaction  costs.  If  all  firms  were  embedded  in  a
comprehensive institutional  structure that  effectively  performed
basic functions like enforcing contracts and  protecting property
rights,  the  differential  importance  of  these  functions  to
12  Particularly the supplier networks organized by  large
firms in Japan,  and the less centralized  "Third Italy" model
celebrated by Piore and Sabel (1984)  among others.38
smaller  firms  would  not  stand  out.  Similarly,  if  all
information that flowed among firms were a strictly public good,
non-rivalrous  in use  and  equally accessible  to firms  of all
sizes, no issue could arise as to how  firm size might  affect
access  to this information.  Assumptions  characterizing these
hypothetical situations are familiar as components of standard
economic models, but they hardly describe pervasive features of
economic reality --  and are perhaps nowhere more in doubt than
in the context of SMEs in developing countries.
Given this background, the second  part of the story begins
with  the observation  that  large firms provide  organizational
substitutes  that  fill  the gaps  in  the general  institutional
structure  of  society.  They  do  so  most  obviously  in  the
governing  of  relations  among  their  constituent  actors.
Functionally,  this  is  the  realm  of  "contract  enforcement,"
although  the  specific  forms of  contract  largely give way  to
those of administrative control.  A similar observation applies
to the enforcement of "property  rights"  within the organization;
administrative  procedures  determine  the allocation  of scarce
resources that would be useful in the work setting to a number
of different members, and internal  controls prevent members from
appropriating  for  personal  use  resources  belonging  to  the
organization  as  a  whole.1 3 Large  firms  also make  their  own
13  It  is  familiar  enough  that  these  various  internal
arrangements  do not work  perfectly,  but  perfection  is not  a
relevant standard.  We hear about the imperfections because the
problems those arrangements address are significant.39
arrangements to protect their property  from external threats,
make  costly  efforts  to access  information  in the environment
that  is of value  to the firm, and invest  in diverse ways of
governing their external transactions.  In each of these cases,
the  "institutional framework"  aspects of  the  large  firm  are
intimately linked to its production and other narrowly economic
activities.  In the phrase used above, they are "one level up"
from  those  activities  --  an  institutional  structure  that  is
superordinate  but  very  nearby.  Firms  therefore  find  it
efficient to implement such structures even in societies where
the quality of the general arrangements for these purposes is
high,  and -often  seek  to  guard  the  autonomy  of  their  own
customized structures relative to society's broader ones.
Small  and  medium  enterprises  have  analogous  needs  for
institutional structure, but do they have analogous methods of
responding to those needs?  The answer probably depends on which
specific needs we are talking about.  Economies of scale in the
performance of specific activities are one major causal factor.
When it comes to the internal aspects of contract enforcement or
property protection, it is far from clear that small firms are
disadvantaged.  On-the-spot  observation  and  decision  by  an
owner-manager  may  be  a  very  efficient  substitute  for  the
elaborate systems that large firms establish for these purposes.
But  when  the  boundaries  of  the  firm  are  being  crossed  --  by
transactions, information, or thieves --  the situation is quite
different.  Fundamental sources of increasing returns come into40
play.  At least in a  metaphorical sense, and sometimes a literal
one, there is more boundary per unit of activity enclosed in a
small firm than there is in a large one.  It takes more yards of
fencing to enclose a given area when the area is fragmented than
when  it is coherent.  A  small firm involved  in an elaborate
inter-firm division of labor may have a  lower ratio of value
added to sales, and many more transactions per sales than a more
integrated  large  firm.  Finally,  it  is generally  costly  to
identify  and  access  information  relevant  to  the  firm's
activities, but much less costly to disseminate the information
internally  once  acquired.  On  a  per  unit  output  basis,
therefore,  small  firms  carry  a  heavier  cost  burden  to  stay
informed than do large ones.
Thus,  it is perfectly  reasonable  that small  firms might
tend  to  prosper  best  under  circumstances  where  they  are
supported by substitutes for the institutional structures that
large  firms  provide  for  themselves.  In  some  cases,  those
substitute institutions are provided by  large  firms to small
ones, particularly through sub-contracting networks.  In other
cases, cooperative relations among firms organized in business
associations  or  local  community  structures  perform  these
functions, sometimes with the support of national governments.
I would  emphasize,  however,  that the requisite  institutional
structures are not generally  provided by governments, even in
advanced countries.  For example, it is overwhelmingly the case
that it is  business firms (not  courts) that settle disputes, and41
firms  that take costly  steps  to avoid  disputes  in the  first
place.  Thus, the proper model  for the kind of institutional
support  most  needed  by  SMEs  is  not  provided  by  the  grand
society-wide institutional arrangements typified by  the legal
system in advanced countries, but the "one level up", accessible
institutional systems that large firms provide for themselves,
and  sometimes  for  their  suppliers. 14 We  might  call  these
support systems "SMIs" --  small and medium institutions.  SMEs
need SMIs to prosper.  To find SMEs that promote development,
look for effective SMIs.  Or, "ask not" what can be done to
enhance the effectiveness of the innumerable SMEs; ask what can
be done  to support the less numerous SMIs on which effective
SMEs generally depend.
The Wave of the Future?  In  considering the possible future
contributions of SMEs to development, it is important to ponder
the  implications of recent  trends  in their  role  in advanced
countries.  There  seems  to  be  little  question  about  the
'4  This  view  seems  quite  consistent  with  the  empirical
evidence marshaled by B. Levy  in his  comparative analysis of
SMEs and their support systems in  Columbia, Indonesia, Korea
and  Japan  (in the series  Can  Intervention Work?,  World  Bank
1994.) It appears, however, that Levy's discussion belies  the
appropriateness of the title of the series.  The core issue (it
turns out) is not  "intervention" but supportive institutional
context.  Sometimes  national  governments  manage  to  play  a
productive role in promoting such a context.
Of course, SMEs may badly need protection from harassment,
extortion, etc., that are  de facto  a part of the society-wide
institutional system.  That  is a different question  from the
question of the kind of affirmative support they need, although
a very important one.42
existence of a broad trend toward an expanded role for smaller
enterprises and also toward the greater relative importance of
small establishments within  large enterprises.  This seems to
have  been  underway  for  about  two  decades,  and  represents  a
reversal of the previously prevailing historical  trend toward
concentration.  Given the limitations of available data and the
complexity of the causal relations that may be involved, it is
no  small  task  to  prove  that  this  trend  is  real  (that  the
measurements mean what they appear to say) and significant (that
the  reasons  involve  some  changes  directly  affecting  the
competitive environments of small units).  As argued by Loveman
and  Sengenberger  (1991), the  strength  of  the  case  for  an
affirmative answer on these points does not rest so much on the
conviction carried by any single piece of well-honed evidence,
but  rather  on  the  scope  of  the  evidence  across  sectors  and
national economies:  "Despite important methodological caveats,
the nine  country studies taken  together present a  convincing
case for a shift in employment to smaller units of production"
(p. 25).
Thus,  in  thinking  about  the  future  roles  of  SMEs  in
developing  countries,  it  may  be  important  to  question  the
relevance  of  current  and  historical  patterns  in  advanced
countries as a  conceptual model.  The appropriate  conceptual
model may be visible only at the "leading edge" of the wave of
structural change in the advanced countries, or may even remain
invisible  at  this  point,  but  accessible  to  imaginative43
conceptualization through extrapolation of visible changes.  In
institutional structure as in technology, there  may be dividends
for latecomers.  Developing countries need not recapitulate the
concentration of production in large, hierarchically structured
organizations.  If  larger  numbers  of  smaller  units  does
constitute  the  preferred  destination  for  modern  economic
organization,  perhaps  developing  countries  can  take  a
substantial short cut in getting there.
The difficulty here, of course, lies in the diagnosis of
the character and direction of the "wave" --  assuming there is
such a wave.  A wide range of considerations are arguably at
work  in producing  the  trend described,  even  after  excluding
those that seek to explain the statistical evidence on SMEs as
an artifact of some more fundamental change." 5 Prominent among
the candidates that have the most far-reaching implications are
two  products  of  the  micro-electronic  revolution,  low-cost
communications and flexible capital equipment.  The former  makes
complex  coordination economically  feasible  even across  large
distances, thus reducing the coordination advantages that large
establishments  derive  from  geographical  concentration  of
activity.  The  latter  reduces  the  cost  advantages  of
15  Among the "artifactual" explanations are the following:
(i) shifts in the sectoral composition of output  in favor of
sectors where SMEs play a larger role, especially the rise of
the service sector;  (ii) counter-cyclical behavior of the SME
employment share, coupled  with a comparatively high incidence of
"bad economic times" in the advanced countries since the mid-
70s; (iii)  cost advantages for small firms because they present
an  inconvenient  target  for  union  organizers  and  government
enforcement of labor standards.44
specialized,  high volume production facilities,  and allows small
firms  to  adjust  their  product  mix  to  a  rapidly-changing
composition  of  demand.  These  technological  changes  are
complemented by  innovations  in management  and  organizational
practice  in  large  firms,  which  increasingly  stress  the
information  and  coordination  role  of  the  strategic  center
relative  to its  direct  role  in  the production  of  goods  and
delivery  services  (Lorenzoni and  Baden-Fuller,  1993).  The
coordination patterns characteristic of successful small  firm
networks  in  industrial districts may  also  count  as  a  recent
innovation here, although the  basic patterns of cooperation have
deep historical roots.  At least in some developing countries,
the operation of these factors might be expected to generate a
21st century industrial structure  without passing through a 20th
century stage on the way.
Research Questions
The following suggestions for research are cast in the form
of a brief characterization of a significant and fairly broad
issue,  followed by  a  list of more  specific topics.  For  any
specific  topic,  feasibility  considerations  such  as  data
availability and available resources obviously loom large.  But
there may be other,  less costly ways  of approaching  the same
broad issue.
1) Broad issue:  The effective management of relationships with
suppliers is increasingly recognized as an important dimension45
of organizational competence for large corporations.  There is
an emergent "best practice" standard in supplier relations that
is defined and exemplified by firms in a variety of sectors --
Toyota in automobiles, IKEA in household furnishings, Benetton
and  Liz  Claiborne  in  apparel.  Prominent  features  of  this
standard  include  long-term  relational  contracting,  high  and
rising quality standards, intense communication, and a strong
emphasis on learning. In many  cases, the supply systems  are
international, and involve small and medium enterprises in LDCs
among their participants.
These  supply  systems  thus  provide  a  paradigm  for  the
transfer of detailed organizational and technological knowledge
to the benefit of enterprises in LDCs.  The question arises as
to whether  World  Bank  initiatives  toward  SMEs  in  developing
countries might  facilitate  their entry  into  similar learning
relationships with other firms --  foreign firms, larger firms in
their own countries, or each other.
Topics! actionable items:
(i) Identify large firms noted for their willingness
to  devote  effort  to  improving  their  suppliers'
operations.
(ii)  Survey these firms on their practices, and on the
criteria they use to identify possible suppliers who
are not currently part of their system.
(iii)  Consider  the  results  of  (ii),  and  other
sources, in defining prevailing "standards" for SMEs.46
Although technical standards are obviously important,
it  is  the  organizational  and  business  practice
standards that should be of greatest interest to the
Bank, because of their greater generality.  We know
that many  SMEs  around  the world  are  meeting  these
standards; in this sense, the prevailing standards do
not offer a mere counsel of perfection.  It might be
helpful for other SMEs around the world to know what
these standards are.  To that end, it  would be helpful
for the Bank to know what they are.
2) Broad issue:  The economic significance of high "turbulence"
(entry and exit rates)  in small firm populations  is not well
understood.  As noted above, the fact of high turbulence is  well
documented  in  advanced  countries.  While  the  corresponding
documentation is largely lacking for LDCs,  the available data
and  impressions  seem  to be  broadly  consistent  with  that  in
advanced countries.  In neither context is there a clear view
(even theoretically) as to whether high failure rates for small
businesses  should be viewed  as  symptomatic  of an  important
shortcoming in the system of economic organization itself, or
whether some quite different  judgment is suggested --  perhaps
even  the opposite  judgment.  This  is a  very deep  and subtle
question; it involves the nature and social functions of firms
in  general  and  small  firms  in  particular,  as  well  as  the
institutionally defined meaning and consequences of "failure."47
Further, the answer to the abstract question will  likely vary
with differences in a wide range of contextual factors.
Topics/ actionable items:
(i)  There is a need for relatively simple theoretical
models  that offer a portfolio of alternative welfare
(cost-benefit)  analyses  of  the  phenomenon  of
turbulence.  The reason for the "portfolio" approach
should  be clear:  the  purpose is to provide conceptual
support for empirical inquiry confronted with a hugely
complex and variegated phenomenon.  The name of the
game is sorting cases, not postulating an answer.  It
is not hard to get started on this task by sketching
out  hypothetical extreme cases  where business failures
do/do  not  imply  significant  social  welfare  losses.
But thornier problems quickly arise.
(ii) Empirical  work  sensitive  to  the  theoretical
issues identified in (i) should follow.  The task is
to develop a perspective on the turbulence phenomenon
that is grounded both theoretically and empirically.
At this point, a variety of types of empirical work
could be helpful, including careful case studies.  A
general methodological issue worthy of attention here
is whether the (short-lived) "enterprise" is the best
unit of analysis; there may be other candidates such
as "the entrepreneur" or perhaps "the entrepreneur's
family."48
(iii)  The policy implications of this line of research
are quite different depending on whether one thinks in
terms  of  a  broad  range  of  policy  instruments  to
promote development, or more specifically in terms of
the  role  of  a  lender  that  needs  to  keep  capital
intact.  As a  lender, the Bank must  concern itself
with the economic  viability of  borrowers regardless of
whether  failure entails  a  social welfare  loss, and
there is an implied need for concern with the credit-
worthiness of borrowers.  In a leadership or advisory
role  for an  initative involving a broader  range of
policy  instruments, the Bank presumably  ought to be
conerned  as  well  with  the  social  cost-benefit
consequencesof  the  initiative.  If  social  welfare
losses from business failures are low, the quality of
individual loans is less of an issue from an economic
standpoint, though  it obviously remains important from
the narrow financial standpoint.  In some case there
might  well  be  significant  interactions  among
instruments;  for  example,  technical  assistance  or
organizational assistance provided free to a group of
firms might  affect  the payback  from loans  to those
firms.  In  both  economic  and  financial  terms,
evaluation of the lending  program would depend on  what
else is in the package.  These policy aspects deserve
careful  examination,  supported  by  good  background49
understanding  of  the  welfare  implications  of
turbulence.
3) Broad issue:  The apparent trend favoring a larger economic
role for smaller production units is another phenomenon that is
not well understood.  In this case, much of the ambiguity arises
from  the  multiplicity  of  underlying  factors  that  could  be
contributing to a phenomenon  observed at a macroscopic  level.
A  plausible  research  objective  would  be  to  identify
circumstances where this trend is clearly present, is autonomous
rather  than induced  by other changes, and appears to depend
importantly on generally operating factors such as the  declining
costs of communication and computation.  The larger  objective is
to understand the new forces operating on the economic role of
SMEs  on  the  ground  that  policy  toward  SMEs  in  developing
countries  should  take  these  forces  into  account  For  this
purpose,  useful  research  could  be  conducted  with  data  from
advanced countries, 16 supplemented to the extent possible with
data from developing countries.
Topics / actionable items.
(i)  The evolution of the inter-firm division of labor
could be tracked by looking at how value added/ sales
ratios  are  developing  by  sector  and by  firm  size.
Declining ratios of value added to sales among large
1  For the general purpose of studying aspects of interfirm
transactions, it would be worth exploring the possibility that
countries with value-added taxes might have better statistical
sources  than  the  U.S.  does  --  or  at  least  a  better  starting
point for an effort to establish a sampling frame.50
firms would  provide statistical confirmation of the
widely remarked trend toward outsourcing and vertical
disintegration of production, and help to identify the
areas where that trend is strong or weak.
(ii)  Several sectors that display contrasting  patterns
of  change  in  the  value-added  structure  could  be
selected  for  intensive  analysis,  with  a  view  to
identifying  major correlates of these change  patterns.
If  possible,  sectors  should  be  selected  that  are
similar  in  many  respects  other  than  the  recent
evolution  of  the  value-added  structure,  so  as  to
reduce the number of candidate explanations for the
patterns that are seen.
4)  Broad  issue:  I  have  suggested  above  that  the  rate  of
learning by  a  small  or medium  enterprise  may  depend  on  the
nature of its transacting  partners.  Research issue 1)  presumes,
in particular, that certain multinational enterprises make good
teachers.  Conversely, SMEs that face local labor markets on the
input side and local markets for consumer goods and services on
the output side may not be well positioned for the relevant sort
of learning.  They may learn very well how to adjust to local
circumstances,  but  that  does  not  mean  that  they  are
participating in the international diffusion of technology and
ways of organizing  --  the process that is the main source of
long-run  hope  for  developing  countries.  If  correct,  this
picture has strong implications for Bank policy.  It would be51
helpful to know whether it is correct --  or the degree to which
it is correct --  so as to better understand whether Bank policy
should be concerned with transacting patterns.  The empirical
challenge here is daunting, but, as usual, something might be
better than nothing.
Topics / actionable items.
(i) Structured, short-term longitudinal case studies
might provide a viable methodology.  In a particular
country, identify a few "prototype" firms in each of
several  taxonomic  categories,  where  the  taxonomic
categories  reflect  the  character  of  transacting
partners  in  input  and  output  markets  (and perhaps
other considerations)  . Obtain baseline data, and then
follow  the  firms  for  a  few  years.  Attempt  to
determine whether  there are patterns  of stasis  and
dynamism at the  micro level that support the idea that
transacting partners are important.
(ii)  Conceivably, there are some statistical data sets
that are of sufficient quality to warrant exploration
from the same viewpoint.
Concluding Coment
It  is obviously  not possible  to study  the problem  as a
whole;  the  quest  for  good  research  topics  is  a  quest  for
feasible  approaches  to  illuminating  some  fraction  of  the
subject.  It is  worth reiterating, however, that the Bank's most52
important long-term advantage in promoting development may lie
in  its  opportunities  to  address  interrelated  obstacles
simultaneously.  It  could,  for  example,  mount  or  promote
concurrent efforts of several types to address the problems of
SMEs in a particular sector,  and perhaps a particular region, in
a particular economy.  It could seek to address the conditions
of  founding  of  new  firms,  provision  of  finance,  technical
assistance,  development  of  mutual  support  institutions,
resolution  of disputes both within  the sector and externally,
and  perhaps  the  reduction  of  counterproductive  governmental
interventions.  Were  the  Bank  to  follow  such  a  coordinated
approach, programs could be designed to generate data that would
illuminate the impacts and interactions of the various policy
elements.  It would then be possible, and important, to exploit
these data with research designs shaped  more by the tradition of
program evaluation (or  even the design of management information
systems)  than  by  the  usual  social  science  concern  with
understanding  the  functioning  of  the  "natural" system  as  it
would be in the absence of policy intervention.APPENDIX
"Market Failure" as an Approach to Economic Organization:
A Brief Critique
The  market  failure  viewpoint  is  one  branch  of  a  larger
theoretical tradition that, as a  whole, offers only limited guidance
concerning  the specific problems  of  economic organization.  For
example, while the  market failure approach directs attention to the
question  of  whether  economic  actors  are  getting  the  correct
incentive signals from  markets, a discussion about the role of small
and medium enterprise is in part about the question of what the set
of economic actors should be.  When the roster of actors is itself
an  issue,  the  standard  "market  failure"  presumption  that  the
requisite virtues already inhere in the actors seems out of place:
which actors are we talking about, precisely?
As a historical matter, the market failure branch of economic
discourse sprang from a main stem that posited "firms" as among the
"given" economic actors.  It further posited a context of costless
and  perfect  economic  institutions that  somehow  accomplished  the
practical  requisites  of  real  markets,  exchange  relations  and
security arrangements --  and then placed that crucial assumption so
far in the background  that it became  invisible.  Also,  sustained
focus on the grand organizational theme of how the posited "firms"
relate to the "consumers," indirectly promoted neglect of the study
of intermediate product markets --  although it is arguable that the
performance  of  those  markets  belongs  (alongside  consumer54
sovereignty)  at  the  heart  of  the  case  for  voluntary  exchange
systems, as against more  centralized alternatives.  The argument
here rests on the point that whereas standard theory assumes full
economic rationality on both sides of all transactions, there are
straightforward reasons for thinking that firms are likely to be
both  more  "rational"  and  more  straightforwardly  economic  in
motivation.  Thus  firm-firm  transactions  should  be  expected  to
approximate theoretical transactions (and their attendant virtues)
better than firm-consumer interactions do.
Paralleling its neglect of the "innards" of firms and of key
institutions, the  market failure tradition  generally provides policy
guidance  only at a very abstract  level.  Just as the underlying
theory  skips  entirely  over  the  "soft"  parts  of  organizational
capability (for example, the part of the "production function" that
generates a firm's  prices), it also offers views of taxes, property
rights, regulations and so forth that abstract from the human beings
and  organizational  arrangements  that  actually  produce  these
institutional "outputs".  One illustration of the consequences of
this  neglect  is  the  enormous  time  lag  that  intervened  between
academic/theoretical  understanding  of  pollution  as  a  "market
failure" problem  (variously  addressable by negotiation, corrective
taxation, or property rights adjustments), and the beginnings of
serious institutional design efforts to implement these ideas.
A dissonant counterpoint to  this shortcoming  of overly abstract
remedies  is  provided  by  examples  where  adherence  to  commonly
accepted theoretical  assumptions interfered  with proper diagnosis of55
the problem in the first place.  For example, as Williamson  (1985)
has  emphasized,  obliviousness  to contract  enforcement  problems
commonly  arising  in  intermediate product  markets  led  antitrust
policy down a path of hostility toward the private arrangements that
coped with those difficulties.  Those arrangements provide, in fact,
the most compelling illustrations of the significance and diversity
of privately-created governance modes  ("private ordering").SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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